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Abstract
We present the detailed account of the quantum(-like) viewpoint to
common knowledge. The Binmore-Brandenburger operator approach
to the notion of common knowledge is extended to the quantum case.
We develop a special quantum(-like) model of common knowledge
based on information representations of agents which can be oper-
ationally represented by Hermitian operators. For simplicity, we as-
sume that each agent constructs her/his information representation
by using just one operator. However, different agents use in general
representations based on noncommuting operators, i.e., incompati-
ble representations. The quantum analog of basic system of common
knowledge features K1 −K5 is derived.
keywords: common knowledge, Binmore-Brandenburger opera-
tor approach, quantum(-like) decision making
1 Introduction
Common knowledge plays the crucial role in establishing of social conventions
(as was firstly pointed out at the scientific level by David Hume in 1740).
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And the last 50 years were characterized by development of numerous formal
(sometimes mathematical, but sometimes not) models of common knowledge
and operating with it. One of the most useful mathematical formalizations is
due to Binmore-Brandenburger [1]. Starting with classical measure-theoretic
model of probability theory (Kolmogorov, 1933) they elaborated the formal
approaches to the notion of common knowledge. The operator approach
Binmore-Brandenburger is based on the notion of agents’ knowledge opera-
tors Ki.
Common knowledge models play an important role in decision making
theory, game theory, and cognitive psychology leading, in particular, to the
Aumann theorem on the impossibility to agree on disagree in the presence
of nontrivial common knowledge and the common prior [2], [3]. Recently the
quantum(-like) decision theory flourished as the result of the fruitful coop-
eration of the psychological and quantum probability communities, see, e.g.,
the monographs [4]-[7]. Therefore it is a good time to present quantum(-like)
formalization of the notion of common knowledge and to extend Aumann’s
argument on “(dis)agree on disagree” to the quantum case. The latter is
discussed in another paper of the authors presented to QI2014 [8] (see also
this paper for extended bibliography on quantum cognition). And in this
note we present the detailed account of the quantum(-like) approach to com-
mon knowledge. We start with a quantum analog of Aumann’s definition
of knowing of an event E for the fixed state of the world ω ∈ Ω. Then we
introduce the knowledge operator corresponding to such a notion of knowing.
We show that this quantum (super)operator satisfies the system of axioms
K1−K2 for the Binmore-Brandenburger [1] knowledge operators. Thus the
quantum knowledge operator can be considered as a natural generalization
of the classical knowledge operator. One of possible interpretations of such
generalization is that the collection of possible information representations
of the world by agents is extended. Such nonclassical information represen-
tations are mathematically given by spectral families of Hermitian operators
(“questions about the world” stated by the agents). In this operator frame-
work we introduce hierarchically defined common knowledge (which was used
to formulate the quantum(-like) analog of the (anti-)Aumann theorem [8]).
In classical theory the operator definition of common knowledge matches
with the heuristic viewpoint on common knowledge; for two agents i = 1, 2,
COMKN An event E is common knowledge at the state of the world ω
if 1 knows E, 2 knows E, 1 knows 2 knows E, 2 knows 1 knows E, and so
on...
Our quantum(-like) notion of operator common knowledge matches with
human intuition as well. (The difference is mathematical formalization of
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knowing.)
To simplify mathematics, we proceed with finite dimensional state spaces.
Generalization to the infinite dimensional case is evident, but it will be based
on more advanced mathematics.
We also remark that our model of quantum(-like) formalization of com-
mon knowledge can be generalized by using the formalism of open quantum
systems leading to questions represented by positive operator valued mea-
sures, cf. [5], [9], [10], or even more general operator valued measures [11].
(In principle, there is no reason to expect that the operational description
of cognitive phenomena, psychology, and economics would be based on the
exactly the same mathematical formalism as the operational description of
physical phenomena. Therefore we cannot exclude that some generalizations
will be involved, see again [11]. ) However, at the very beginning we would
like to separate the mathematical difficulties from the formalism by itself;
therefore we proceed with quantum observables of the Dirac-von Neumann
class, Hermitian operators and projector valued operator measures.
2 Set-theoretic model of common knowledge
In the classical set-theoretic model events (propositions) are represented by
subsets of some set Ω. Elements of this set represent all possible states of the
world (or at least states possible for some context). In some applications, e.g.,
in sociology and economics, Ω represents possible states of affairs. Typically
considerations are reduced to finite (or countable) state spaces. In the general
case, one has to proceed as it common in classical (Kolmogorov) model of
probability theory and consider a fixed σ-algebra of subsets of Ω, say F ,
representing events (propositions).
There is a group of agents (which are individual or collective cognitive
entities); typically the number of agents is finite, call them i = 1, 2, ..., N.
These individuals are about to learn the answers to various multi-choice
questions about the world (about the state of affairs), to make observations.
In the Bayesian model agents assign prior probability distributions for the
possible states of the world; in many fundamental considerations such as,
e.g., Aumann’s theorem, it is assumed that the agents set the common prior
distribution p, see [8] for more details. Here one operates with the classical
Kolmogorov probability space (Ω,F , p). In this note we shall not study the
problem of the prior update, see again [8]. Therefore at the classical level
our considerations are restricted to set-theoretic operations.
Each agent creates its information representation for possible states of
the world based on its own possibilities to perform measurements, “to ask
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questions to the world.” Mathematically these representations are given by
partitions of Ω : P(i) = (P (i)j ), where ∪jP (i)j = Ω and P (i)j ∩P (i)k ∅, j 6= k. Thus
an agent cannot get to know the state of the world ω precisely; she can only
get to know to which element of its information partition P
(i)
j = P
(i)(ω) this
ω belongs. The agent i knows an event E in the state of the world ω if
P (i)(ω) ⊂ E. (1)
Let Ki(E) be the event “ith agent knows E”:
KiE = {ω ∈ Ω : P (i)(ω) ⊂ E}. (2)
As was shown by Binmore-Brandenburger [1], the knowledge operator Ki has
the following properties:
K1 : KiE ⊂ E
K2 : Ω ⊂ KiΩ
K3 : Ki(E ∩ F ) = KiE ∩KiF
K4 : KiE ≤ KiKiE
K5 : KiE ≤ KiKiE
Here, for an event E, E¯ denotes its complement. We remark that one can
proceed another way around [1]: to start with K1 − K5 as the system of
axioms determining the operator of knowledge and then derive that such an
operator has the form (2).
The statement K1 has the following meaning: if the ith agent knows
E, then E must be the case; the statement K2 : the ith agent knows that
some possible state of the world in Ω occurs; K3 : the ith agent knows a
conjunction if, and only if, i knows each conjunct; K4 : the ith agent knows
E, then she knows that she knows E; K5 : if the agent does not know an
event, then she knows that she does not know.
3 Quantum(-like) scheme
Let H be (finite dimensional) complex Hilbert space; denote the scalar prod-
uct in H as 〈·|·〉. For an orthogonal projector P, we set HP = P (H), its
image, and vice versa, for subspace L of H, the corresponding orthogonal
projector is denoted by the symbol PL.
In our model the “states of the world” are given by pure states (vectors of
norm one); events (propositions) are represented by orthogonal projectors.
As is well known, these projectors form a lattice (“quantum logic”) with
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the operations corresponding to operations on orthocomplemented subspace
lattice of complex Hilbert space H (each projector P is identified with its
image-subspace of HP ).
Questions posed by agents are mathematically described by self-adjoint
operators, say A(i). Since we proceed with finite-dimensional state spaces,
A(i) =
∑
j a
(i)
j P
(i)
j , where (a
(i)
j ) are real numbers, all different eigenvalues of
A(i), and (P
(i)
j ) are the orthogonal projectors onto the corresponding eigen-
subspaces. Here (aj) encode possible answers to the question of the ith agent.
The system of projectors P(i) = (P (i)j ) is the spectral family of A(i). Hence,
for any agent i, it is a “disjoint partition of unity”: ∨kP (i)k = I, P (i)k ∧P (i)m =
0, k 6= m, or equivalently ∑k P (i)k = I, P (i)k P (i)m = 0, k 6= m. This spectral
family can be considered as information representation of the world by the
ith agent. In particular, “getting the answer a
(i)
j ” is the event which is
mathematically described by the projector P
(i)
j .
If the state of the world1 is represented by ψ and, for some k0, Pψ ≤ P (i)k0 ,
then, for the quantum probability distribution corresponding to this state,
we have:
pψ(P
(i)
k0
) = TrPψP
(i)
k0
= 1 and, for k 6= k0, pψ(P(i)k ) = TrPψP(i)k = 0.
Thus, in this case, the event P
(i)
k0
happens with the probability one and other
events from information representation of the world by the ith agent have
zero probability.
However, opposite to the classical case, in general ψ need not belong
to any concrete subspace H
P
(i)
k
. Nevertheless, for any pure state ψ, there
exists the minimal projector Q
(i)
ψ of the form
∑
m P
(i)
jm
such that Pψ ≤ Q(i)ψ .
Set O
(i)
ψ = {j : P (i)j ψ 6= 0}. Then Q(i)ψ =
∑
j∈O
(i)
ψ
P
(i)
j . The projector Q
(i)
ψ
represents the ith agent’s knowledge about the ψ-world. We remark that
pψ(Q
(i)
ψ ) = 1.
1The general discussion on the meaning of the state of the world is presented in our
second conference paper [8]. It is important to remark that in models of qunatum cognition
states are typically not physical states, but information states. They give the mental
representation of the state of affairs in human society in general or in a social group
of people. In particular, such a ψ can be the mental representation of a real physical
phenomenon. However, even in this case ψ is not identified with the corresponding physical
state. (By using the terminology invented by H. Atmanspacher and H. Primas, see, e.g.,
[12], we can consider the physical state as an ontic state and its mental image as an
epistemic state.) This interpretation of representation of a state of the world by a pure
quantum state matches well with the information interpretation of quantum mechanics
(due to Zeilinger and Brukner). Roughly speaking this ψ-function is not in nature, but in
heads of people. See Remark 1 for further discussion.
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Consider the system of projectors P˜(i) consisting of sums of the projectors
from P(i) :
P˜(i) = {P =
∑
m
P
(i)
jm}. (3)
Then
Q
(i)
ψ = min{P ∈ P˜(i) : Pψ ≤ P}. (4)
Definition 1. For the ψ-state of the world and the event E, the ith agent
knowns E if
Q
(i)
ψ ≤ E. (5)
It is evident that if, for the state of the world ψ, the ith agent knows E,
then ψ ∈ HE. In general the latter does not imply that E is known (for the
state ψ), see [8] for a discussion on definitions of knowing an event in the
classical set-theoretic and quantum Hilbert space models.
Remark 1. For a single agent i, “quantumness” is enconded in the possi-
bility that the state of the world ψ can be superposition of states belonging to
different components of its information representation. In the classical prob-
abilistic framework knowing of an event E means that, although an agent
does not know precisely the state of the world ω, she/he knows precisely at
least to which component Pj this state belong. For quantum(-like) think-
ing agent, a superposition state of the world does not give a possibility for
“precise orientation” even in her/his information representation.
Example 1. (Boeing MH17) For example, let us consider the case of the
crush of Malaysian Boeing MH17 at Ukraine. As was pointed out in footnote
3, the state of the world ψ represents the state of believes in society about
possible sources of this crush. Suppose that there are only two possibilities:
either the airplane was shut down by Keiv’s military forces or by Donetsk’s
militants. For the illustrative purpose, it is sufficient to consider the two
dimensional state space (although the real information state space related
to the MH17-crush has a huge dimension depending on variety or political,
economic, and military factors). Consider the basis (eK , eD) representing the
possibilities: eK : “Kiev is responsible”, eD : “Donetsk is responsible”. (We
remark that in this model, if Kiev is reponsible than Donetsk is not and vise
versa.) In our model
ψMH17 = c1eK + c2eD, (6)
where c1 and c2 complex probabilistic amplitudes for Kiev and Donetsk re-
sponsibilities, respectively. An agent tries to get know the truth about the
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MH17 crush by asking experts (say in terrorism). 2 She/he asked about their
opinions; so the single question-observable is in the use: “Who is responsi-
ble?” In the quantum model this agent operates with the spectral family
P = {P1, P2}, where P1 = PeK , P2 = PeD . If both amplitudes in (6) are
nonzero (and in the present situation for July 24, 2014, it can be assumed
that c1 = c2 = 1/
√
2), then, for this state of the world, neither the event EK
represented by P1 nor the event ED represented by P2 is known (to be true)
for this agent. In the classical model the state of the world ω has to belong
either to the element P1 of the information partition or to the element P2.
Thus one (and only one) of the events EK and ED has to be known.
We now define the knowledge operator Ki which applied to any event E,
yields the event “ith agent knows that E.”
Definition 2. KiE = PHKiE , where HKiE = {φ : Q
(i)
φ/‖φ‖ ≤ E}.
See [8] for the proof of the following proposition:
Proposition 1. For any event E, the set HKiE is a linear subspace of
H.
Thus definition 2 is consistent. The operatorKi has the properties similar
to the properties of the classical knowledge operator:
Proposition 2. For any event E,
K1 : KiE ≤ E. (7)
Proof. Take nonzero φ ∈ HKiE . Then Q(i)φ/‖φ‖ ≤ E and, hence,
H
Q
(i)
φ/‖φ‖
⊂ HE.
This implies that φ ∈ HE and that HKiE ⊂ HE .
We also remark that trivially
K2 : I ≤ KiI, (8)
in fact,
I = KiI.
2The first point is related to the discussion in footnote 3. The ψMH17 is not the actual
physical state! The real physical state of affairs can be (mentally) identified either with
eK or with eD; the ontic state by the Atmanspacher-Primas terminology. However, one
has be careful in putting too much weight to the ontic state. It might happen that it
would be never known.
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Proposition 3. For any pair of events E, F,
E ≤ F implies KiE ≤ KiF. (9)
Proof. Take nonzero φ ∈ HKiE . Then Q(i)φ/‖φ‖ ≤ E ≤ F. Thus φ ∈ KiF.
Proposition 4. For any event pair of events E, F,
K3 : KiE ∧KiF = KiE ∧ F. (10)
Proof. a). Take nonzero φ ∈ HKiE ∩HKiF . Then Q(i)φ/‖φ‖ ≤ E and Q(i)φ/‖φ‖ ≤
F. Hence, Q
(i)
φ/‖φ‖ ≤ E∧F and φ ∈ HKiE∧F . Therefore KiE∧KiF ≤ KiE∧F.
b). Take nonzero φ ∈ HKiE∧F . Then Q(i)φ/‖φ‖ ≤ E∧F and, hence, Q(i)φ/‖φ‖ ≤
E and Q
(i)
φ/‖φ‖ ≤ F. Therefore φ ∈ HKiE ∩HKiE = HKiE∧KiF and KiE ∧F ≤
KiE ∧KiF.
Proposition 5. For any event E,
KiE =
∑
P
(i)
j ≤E
P
(i)
j . (11)
Proof. a). First we show that KiE ≤
∑
P
(i)
j ≤E
P
(i)
j . Take nonzero φ ∈
HKiE . Then Q
(i)
φ/‖φ‖ ≤ E and φ =
∑
j∈O
(i)
φ/‖φ‖
P
(i)
j φ. Since
∑
j∈O
(i)
φ/‖φ‖
P
(i)
j ≤ E,
then for any j ∈ O(i)φ/‖φ‖, P (i)j ≤ E. Therefore φ =
∑
P
(i)
j ≤E
P
(i)
j φ.
b). Now we show that
∑
P
(i)
j ≤E
P
(i)
j ≤ KiE. Let φ =
∑
P
(i)
j ≤E
P
(i)
j φ. Then
Q
(i)
φ/‖φ‖ ≤
∑
P
(i)
j ≤E
P
(i)
j ≤ E.
We also remark that
E =
∑
P
(i)
jk
implies KiE = E. (12)
This immediately implies that
KiE = KiKiE (13)
and, in particular, we obtain the following result (important for comparison
with the classical operator approach to definition of common knowledge):
Proposition 6. For any event E,
K4 : KiE ≤ KiKiE. (14)
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Finally, we have:
Proposition 7. For any event E,
(I −KiE) = Ki(I −KiE). (15)
Proof. Take for simplicity that KiE =
∑m
j=1 P
(i)
j , see (11). Then I −
KiE =
∑
j>m P
(i)
j . By using (12) we obtain that Ki(I −KiE) = (I −KiE).
In particular, we obtained that
K5 : (I −KiE) ≤ Ki(I −KiE). (16)
The classical analogs of K1−K5 form the axiomatic base of the operator
approach to common knowledge [1]. (Therefore we were so detailed in the
presentation of K1 − K5; in particular, this aim, to match closer with the
classical case, explains the above transitions from statements in the form
of equalities, which are definitely stronger, to statements in the form of in-
equalities.) We also remark that in the classical approach to the knowledge
operator the classical analog of the system K1−K5 corresponds to the modal
system S5 and of the system K1−K4 to the modal system S4, see [13]. To
analyze our quantum system K1−K5 from the viewpoint of its logical struc-
ture is an interesting and nontrivial problem.
Remark 2. (Quantum truth?) This is a good place to discuss the
truth content of quantum logic (which is formally represented as orthocom-
plemented closed subspace lattice of complex Hilbert space). There are two
opposite viewpoints on the truth content of quantum logic, see [14], [15] for
the detailed discussion. From one viewpoint, quantum logic carries not only
the novel formal representation of knowledge about a new class of physi-
cal phenomena, but also assigns to statements about these phenomena (at
least to some of them) a special truth value, “nonclassical truth”. Another
viewpoint is that one can proceed even in the quantum case with the clas-
sical notion of truth as correspondence, which was explicated rigorously by
Tarski’s semantic theory, see [14], [15]. The same problem states even more
urgently in applications of the quantum formalism in cognitive science and
psychology: Does quantum logic express new (nonclassical) truth assignment
to propositions? Opposite to Garola et al. [14], [15], the authors of this paper
consider quantum formalism as expressing the new type of truth assignment,
cf. [16]. However, the problem is extremely complex and it might happen
that our position is wrong and the position of Garola [14], see also Garola
and Sozzo [15], is right. However, nowadays our approach is more common
in discussions on the logical structure of quantum mechanics. It is usual in
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literature, e.g., [17] to mention the use of different geometries, or probability
theories, to uphold the thesis that also different logics could be needed in
different physical theories.
Remark 3. (Accessibility of quantum truth) The structures discovered in
this paper are the formalization of the specific notion of common knowledge.
Thus they do not by themselves formalize a notion of truth, but of a specific
access to truth. Therefore, although the problem of whether the “quantum
truth” can be reduced to the “classical truth” discussed in Remark 2 is
important for clarification of quantum knowldege theory, it has no direct
relation to the subject of this paper.
Definition 3. Agent i’s possibility-projector H(i)ψ at the state of the world
ψ is defined as
H(i)ψ =
∧
{ψ∈Ki(E)}
E.
It is easy to see that
H(i)ψ = Q(i)ψ . (17)
It is interesting to point out that the collection of i-agent’s possibility-
projectors (for all possible state) does not coincide with her spectral family
and that different projectors are not mutually orthogonal. The latter is the
crucial difference from the classical case. In the latter any “knowledge-map”
Ki defined on the subsets of the set of states of the world, denoted as Ω, and
satisfying axioms K1−K5 generates possibility sets giving disjoint partition
of Ω.
Then, as in the classical case, we define:
M0E = E,M1E = K1E ∧ ...∧KNE, ...,Mn+1E = K1MnE ∧ ...∧KNMnE, ...
As usual, M1E is the event “all agents know that E” and so on. We can
rewrite this definition by using subspaces, instead of projectors:
HM1E = HK1E ∩ ... ∩HKNE , ..., HMn+1E = HK1MnE ∩ ... ∩HKNMnE , ...
Now we define the “common knowledge” operator, as mutual knowledge of
all finite degrees:
κE = ∧∞n=0MnE.
Based on such quantum(-like) formalization of common knowledge, the va-
lidity of the Aumann theorem was analyzed in [8].
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4 Possible generalization to multi-question in-
formation representations
We considered a very special model of knowledge and common knowledge in
which information representation of each agent i is based on a single question-
operator A(i). Of course, it is natural to consider a more general model in
which the ith agent can create his information representation based on the
state of the world ψ by using a few question-observables, A
(i)
k , k = 1, ...,M.
First of all consider the case of compatible observables, i.e., [A
(i)
k , A
(i)
s ] = 0.
Already in this case generalization of our model is nontrivial and non-unique.
First we recall how joint measurement of compatible observables is treated
in quantum mechanics, starting with von Neumann[18]. Consider the case
M = 2 and omit the agent index i. Thus the information representation is
based on two question-observables which are mathematically represented by
commuting operators A1 and A2. There exists a Hermitian operator R such
that both operators can be represented as functions of R : A1 = f1(R), A2 =
f2(R). Then the joint measurement of these operators is reduced to mea-
surement of the observable represented by R and, for its value r, the values
f1(r) and f2(r) are assigned to compatible question-observables. Introduc-
tion of such a “ joint measurement operator” R completely washes out the
individual spectral families of Ak, k = 1, 2, which played the crucial role in
the definitions of knowledge/common knowledge. Suppose that the operator
R has the spectral decomposition
R =
∑
j
rjPj.
Then the corresponding knowledge model is simply based on the projectors
R = (Pj). (Thus we get nothing new comparing with the previous sections.)
Consider the system of projectors R˜ consisting of sums of the projectors from
R, see (3) (We work in the finite dimensional case, so all sums are finite.)
For each state of the world ψ, we introduce the projector
Qψ = min{P ∈ R˜ : Pψ ≤ P}. (18)
For the ψ-state of the world and the event E, the agent knowns E if
Qψ ≤ E. (19)
We call this model of knowing the von Neumann model.
Although the presented scheme of measurement is the standard for quan-
tum mechanics, it is not self-evident that precisely this scheme have to be
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used as the basis for the quantum(-like) knowledge model corresponding to
an agent operating with a family of questions represented by commuting op-
erators. We propose another scheme which seems to be more natural for
the quantum modeling of cognition. The main objection to application of
the standard (von Neumann) quantum mechanical scheme of measurement
for compatible observables is that in general an agent has not reason to
try to construct the single observable such that both compatible question-
observables can be expressed as its functions. Even if this is always possible
theoretically, practically this process may be complicated and time consum-
ing. An agent can prefer to proceed in testing knowing of an event E by
using each question separately. Mathematically this scheme is described as
follows.
Consider the spectral families of the question-operators (again we restrict
consideration to the case of two operators), P1 = (P1j) and P2 = (P2j)
(we remind that the upper index corresponding to the agent was omitted).
Consider the systems of projectors P˜k, k = 1, 2, consisting of sums of the
projectors from Pk : P˜k = {P =
∑
m Pkjm}.
For each state of the world ψ and k = 1, 2, we introduce the projectors
Qk;ψ = min{P ∈ P˜k : Pψ ≤ P}. (20)
Definition 1A. For the ψ-state of the world and the event E, the agent
knowns E if
either Q1;ψ ≤ E or Q2;ψ ≤ E. (21)
It is clear that such knowing of E implies its “von Neumann knowing” based
on (18), (19). However, the inverse is not true.
Example 2. The state space H of an agent is four dimensional with
the orthonormal basis (e1, e2, e3, e4), the projectors P11 and P12 project H
onto the subspaces with the bases (e1, e2) and (e3, e4) and the projectors P21
and P22 project H onto the subspaces with the bases (e1, e4) and (e2, e3).
The spectral family of the operator R is given by one dimensional projectors
Pj = Pej . Consider the event E given by the projector onto the subspace
with the basis (e1, e2, e3). Take the state of the world ψ = (e1 + e2 + e3)/
√
3.
Then Qψ = E and the agent operating in the von Neumann scheme, i.e., who
spent efforts to prepare the question-observable representing both compatible
questions-operators, knows E. However, the agent who produces knowledge
by using two question-observables separately does not know E. For him,
Q1;ψ = P11 + P12 = I as well as Q1;ψ = P21 + P22 = I.
One of the advantages of the “either/or” scheme is that it has the straight-
forward generalization to incompatible observables, the same definition, Def-
inition 1A.
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Example 3. The state space H of an agent is two dimensional. Consider
in it two orthonormal bases (e11, e12) and (e21, e22) such that 〈e1j |e2m〉 6= 0
and the one-dimensional projectors corresponding to these bases, Pkj = Pekj .
Here Pk = {Pk1, Pk2} and P˜k = {Pk1, Pk2, I}, k = 1, 2. Consider the event
E1 = P11. Then this agent knowns it (“through the question observable with
the spectral family P1”.) Consider the event E1 = P21. Then this agent
knowns it (“through the question observable with the spectral family P2”).
Since projectors, for different k, do not commute, there is no the “joint
measurement possibility” and the operator R does not exists, so the knowing
scheme based on on (18), (19) cannot be applied at all.
However, theory of such generalized knowledge operators is really beyond
the scope of this paper.
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